Founded in 1994
|
Founded in 1994 |
|
SOLIDARITY AND SUBSIDIARITY: LILLE, FRANCE ~ CALL FOR PAPERS ~ Viewed as a global imperative of social policy, global, or at least regional, solidarity between rich and poor nations is often viewed as antithetical to subsidiarity. In fact, however, the moral experience of solidarity is rooted not in abstract ideological schemes of redistribution, but in concern and empathy with one's neighbour, where the New-Testament question of "But who is my Neighbour?" poses a concrete situational challenge. Rather than viewing solidarity and subsidiarity as necessarily competing values, subsidiarity is also a precondition for locally-based engagement and authentic moral and political choice, including choices about solidarity. Transfer schemes that support "welfare dependency" and undermine the vitality of social and economic life by contributing to the erosion of human and social capital in receiving regions, such as Southern Italy or Eastern Germany, do not deserve to be supported in the name of "solidarity" though there are rationales for more constructive forms of aid. In the European political context, appeals to "subsidiarity" often are used to assert the rights of member states against those of the European Union, although the joint letter on "subsidiarity" by President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl that was discussed at the Cardiff European Summit of June 1998 explicitly denied that "renationalization" of the community was intended. If the reassertion of national power and aversion to tax pooling were the driving force behind "subsidiarity," this term, used as a code word, would not be friendly to small member states or candidates for membership. Properly understood, however, subsidiarity is a principle that applies between each of the multiple tiers of government, from the smallest unit on up. It therefore applies as much to the division of responsibilities or "competences" between the European Union and its member states as to the division of responsibilities within those states and across their border regions. Indeed, the units of cooperation that are organized following the functional principles of subsidiarity, for instance in river-basin management, need not respect borders drawn at higher levels or conform to higher-level political structures provided by national parties and bureaucracies. In this respect more decentralized public choice and more immediate and consequential democracy would reduce the scope for, and de-emphasize, asymmetries between large and small countries.
For more information, please contact: Dr. George M. von Furstenberg
|
